I. Introduction
Central banks in Asia and the Pacific have overwhelmingly chosen inflation as the principal objective of monetary policy. Some central banks, but not all, have declared themselves to be inflation targeters, while others pursue their objective without referring to this particular label. Moreover, whether or not they refer to their strategy as inflation targeting, central banks in the region have chosen diverse approaches to achieving their inflation targets: for example with respect to how explicit the target is, the choice of inflation indicator, and the choice of instrument. All this suggests that the region is a good sample with which to examine the lessons from the experiences of central banks that have adopted formal inflation targeting and those with more eclectic approaches to targeting inflation.
To this end, we examine monetary policy institutional changes in Asia and the Pacific to assess whether these can be traced to subsequent inflation performance. Section II highlights trends in twelve regional economies toward greater central bank focus on inflation control, institutional independence and transparency over the past two decades.
With the six formal inflation targeting economies and six others, Section III explores the impact of these changes on cross-country inflation dynamics and on private sector inflation expectation formation. Section IV then addresses some policy implications associated with evolving views of targeting inflation in the region, and concludes that our results add to the growing body of evidence that formal inflation is not the only monetary policy framework capable of delivering price stability; in other words, targeting inflation is important but there are many ways to skin that cat.
II. Monetary policy objectives and institutional arrangements in Asia-Pacific

Objectives and strategies
All but one of the twelve central banks in the region have price stability as a target for monetary policy, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority being the exception (Table 1 ). The HKMA puts exclusive emphasis on exchange rate stability (vis-à-vis the US dollar) and pursues this goal by means of a currency board arrangement. Three central banks -the People's Bank of China, Bank Indonesia, and Bank Negara Malaysia -state the goal as maintaining the stability of the value of the currency which could mean either the internal value in terms of goods and services, i.e. the price level, or the external value namely the exchange rate. Bank Indonesia makes it explicit that the term refers to both aspects. Two central banks -the Reserve Bank of India and the Bank Negara Malaysia -state that an adequate supply of credit to the economy is also an explicit goal of the central bank.
Strategies adopted to achieve the objectives differ (Table 2) 
Central bank governance and independence
The ability of a central bank to achieve its objective depends in part on the institutional environment in which it operates. A large literature has investigated the link between measures of economic performance -usually inflation -and various indicators of central bank governance and independence (CBGI). A general conclusion of this literature is that central bank independence tends to be associated with better inflation performance, although there is some evidence that this result applies to developed economies only (Cuikerman et al (1992) ). Rather than pursuing the link between CBIG in the region and macroeconomic performance, we will examine the evolution in the ASW indices with the view to detect any trend over time and to see whether there is any appreciable difference between inflation targeting central bank and the others. We will also look at whether the crisis in the region in 1997-98 acted as a wake-up call for the authorities in the most affected countries in the sense that they altered the governance structure of their respective central banks after the crisis.
Graph 1 shows the overall value of the CBIG index for two years, 1996 and 2005. 3 The first is chosen to represent the situation before the Asian financial crisis and the second is the latest available value in the ASW data set. With the exception of India and New Zealand for which there is no change, all countries show some improvement over time. This is consistent with the notion that policy makers have at least in part accepted the view that greater central bank independence is desirable. The sets of bars on the right hand side of the graph shows averages of five groups of jurisdictions: all jurisdictions in the sample, the inflation-targeting countries, central banks that are not inflation targeters, the countries most affected by the Asian crises (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand), and finally the 'non-crisis' countries. These bars reveal that both inflation targeting and Crisis countries have experienced larger changes in the overall index than their respective counterparts. Graphs 2 and 3 explore these differences at a more disaggregated level.
1 Fry (1996) is a forerunner in this respect. Comparing the crisis with the non-crisis countries (Graph 3c) reveals that the financial crisis did seem to lead to particularly significant reforms in the areas of political independence and the ability to set price stability objectives, the latter probably due to the overlap between crisis countries and new inflation targeting countries. Table 3 Finally it is of interest to note the study by Garcia-Herrero and Remolona ( Whether they are inflation targeters or 'merely' target inflation, most central banks in the region have gained legal and/or political independence during the past decade. They have also seen improvements in other aspects of governance usually associated with enhanced ability to achieve inflation control.
While there are differences in the evolution of central bank independence and governance between the inflation targeting central banks and the other central banks in our sample, it is an open question whether these differences have resulted in differences in macroeconomic performance, in particular inflation performance, between the corresponding economies. In the next section we present evidence bearing on this question as well as on the more specific issue whether the adoption of inflation targeting as such confers some additional benefits.
II. Assessing the comparative performance of Asia-Pacific inflation targeters
There is no doubt that inflation performance in inflation targeting countries in the region has been remarkable when compared to the pre-inflation targeting days. In this section, we examine various statistical measures of inflation stability to explore whether the adoption of explicit inflation targeting was particularly effective in achieving the goal of inflation control in Asia and the Pacific. In addition to examining performances before and after the adoption of inflation targeting, we contrast the experiences in controlling inflation between inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting central banks in the region.
Inflation performance amongst Asia-Pacific inflation targeting economies was strong
For the inflation targeting central banks, two performance criteria are central: the achievement of their inflation targets and reducing inflation volatility (ie fostering inflation stability). Despite the challenging policy environment of the last several years, inflation targeting central banks have been able to avoid some of the inflation control problems they had experienced in the past.
Hitting inflation targets. Inflation performance can be assessed in a variety of ways.
The most stringent is whether the numerical target was hit. Such deviations from target, however, may be too strict a criterion for assessing performance. Indeed, inflation targeting central banks in the region have not generally defined success as always being at the target or even inside the target bands. Rather, the more conventional approach is to announce a target range over a medium-term horizon (see Table   2 in previous section). For example, Australia's target range is 2-3% for headline CPI inflation "over the medium term", and Korea's is 2.5-3.5% in terms of a three-year average annual inflation for headline inflation. Operationally, central banks choose a path for policy rates that puts inflation on a general trajectory towards the middle of the inflation target range.
Using this looser criterion, one could reasonably argue that central banks in the region have achieved their respective goals. Graph 4 shows that inflation rates in the region have consistently gravitated to the center of the target ranges whenever deviations arose. The success stands in stark contrast to the more volatile inflation behavior evident prior to the adoption of inflation targeting.
Notwithstanding this success, it is noteworthy that the deviations from the inflation targets have hardly been symmetric. While there have been breaches both on the upside and the downside, most have been on the upside. Moreover, the biggest deviations from target have generally been on the upside.
There may be several explanations for this asymmetry. One view is that the period of inflation targeting has been so short that a full range of symmetric shocks, especially large and persistent ones, has yet to be experienced. This view would argue that more symmetry would be observed over time. Another view would suggest that, despite the constraining features of explicit inflation targeting frameworks, central banks are still relatively more concerned about subpar growth and deflation than periodic but modest breaches of the upper end of the target ranges. This would suggest that, on average, inflation would exceed the middle of the inflation target range.
Achieving lower inflation volatility. Another performance criterion is inflation volatility. Here the record is far clearer. Inflation volatility generally declined across the region. Indeed, the GDP-weighted average of inflation volatility from 1986 to 1990 is 64 percent higher than that in 2008. Yet the decline in inflation volatility was hardly monotonic across the region during the period, as Graph 5 illustrates. For example, the Philippines and New Zealand certainly achieved much better inflation performance with respect to this measure of volatility; however, Indonesia exhibited higher volatility after the adoption of inflation targeting than in the early 1990s, although part of the earlier stability may have been somewhat illusory because of the extensive use of administered prices for important staples.
Comparative performance with non-inflation targeters
The experience of the non-inflation targeters over the same period is equally noteworthy. Graph 5 (right-hand panel) indicates that inflation volatility for the non-inflation targeting central banks was either low or falling across the region. While this behavior underscores the favorable inflation environment in the region as a whole, it does raise questions about the marginal contribution of explicit inflation targeting regimes in achieving this outcome. In other words, it is not clear that the adoption of inflation targeting per se has yielded qualitatively different inflation performance -at least with respect to the inflation volatility criterion -than that in the non-inflation targeting countries. In terms of inflation levels, non-inflation targeting central banks have shown roughly the same success as inflation targeting central banks in achieving low inflation (Graph 6). For the non-inflation targeters, inflation rates were generally lower in the past ten years than in the previous decade. Two notable exceptions are evident for economies with both types of monetary policy frameworks. The Asian crisis in the late 1990s led to a spike in inflation, especially in Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. More recently, the boom-bust in commodity prices led to a transitory rise in inflation, which will be discussed at the end of this section.
Another similarity between the inflation-targeting and non-inflation targeting central banks is that short-term policy interest rates have become lower and smoother for those central banks using this rate as their primarily policy tool. In the 2000s, most policy interest rate cycles exhibited lower frequency swings than in the 1980s and early 1990s. This central bank behavior was seen well beyond the region and was consistent with greater central bank transparency as documented in the previous section. The greater clarity about the goals and policy frameworks of central banks has been seen as elevating the role of private sector expectations in influencing economic decisions (Woodford, 2003) . 
Delving deeper into the inflation record
Given the close comparative performance of the inflation targeters and the other central banks, we now delve more deeply into the characteristics of each country's inflation process to see if more subtle differences between inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters emerge. We first look at various measures of inflation persistence and examine how inflation persistence has evolved over time, focusing on the permanent and transitory components of the inflation process. Then we explore the implications of the choice of inflation targeting on private sector expectations, using panel regression methods. Theory would suggest that a significant change in monetary policy regimes, such as adopting explicit inflation targeting, should influence the time-series behavior of inflation and the expectations of the private sector. Finally, Hong Kong and Singapore also stand out as having relatively low estimates of θ . This might not be so surprising given their exchange rate regimes. Hong Kong adopted a currency board that has kept the bilateral exchange rate with the US dollar within a narrow corridor. Singapore, in contrast, controls its exchange rate against a trade-weighted basket of currencies of major trading partners; the Monetary Authority of Singapore uses this exchange rate as its policy tool to promote price stability and sustainable economic growth.
The technical nature of the discussion in this section should not obscure the basic point. The time-series econometric findings indicate that inflation performance has improved in Asia and the Pacific, that improvements in regional price stability do not appear to correspond closely to the decision of some central banks to adopt formal inflation targeting.
Exploring the cross-sectional dimension of inflation expectations
While instructive, the time-series measures of inflation performance above are ex post realizations that may obscure some of the ex ante benefits of explicit inflation targeting. 
Does inflation targeting account for the narrowing of the forecast distributions?
The evidence presented in the previous section indicates that there have been subtle changes in inflation dynamics in Asia-Pacific. In this section, we explore the consequences for the shapes of private sector forecast distributions of inflation.
One natural question is whether these shifts in the cross-sectional inflation distributions are correlated in some way with the adoption of formal inflation targeting in the region. Graph 9 illustrates the shifts in the location as well as the shapes of the distributions (estimated with kernel density estimators). The estimated distributions represent the range of views that private sector forecasters had for inflation for the years 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2008 (the forecasters were surveyed in January of each preceding year). All else the same, the adoption of inflation targeting should lead to a shift to the left, indicating a move to lower inflation, and a sharpening of the distribution, indicating less dispersion amongst the private sector forecasters. Indeed, this general tendency can be seen in the behavior of the estimated cross-sectional distributions for the region. A few caveats are important to note.
First, survey we only have data from mid-1990 onwards owing to the data limitations of the Consensus Economics surveys. At the date that our data begin, both New Zealand and Australia had adopted explicit inflation targeting several years previously. For New Zealand, which adopted inflation targeting early on, the cross-sectional distribution shifts a bit to the right from 1996, reflecting that the raising of the upper inflation range bound from 2% to 3%
in the mid-1990s and the raising of the lower bound in the early 2000s from 0% to 1%.
Notwithstanding the shift in the modes of the estimated distributions, the dispersion of inflation expectations noticeably sharpened over time. For Australia, even though the inflation target bands did not change, the cross-sectional dispersion of inflation expectations sharpened too. Overall, the evolution of the private sector forecast distributions is consistent with the view that there has been a greater focus on inflation control in the region. To delve further into the links between these shapes of the forecast distributions and the monetary policy regime, it is important to distinguish the role of the regime from the size of the nominal shocks hitting the economy in each year. To achieve this, we now turn to panel regression methods. Table 4 reports the results using the overall CBGI and the subindex based relating to monetary policy directly. We use the January Consensus Economics survey for a given year and the annual CBGI. The results are loosely supportive of the view that central bank index has had a significant impact on the formation of private sector inflation forecasts. The sign is intuitively plausible, ie greater independence is correlated with less dispersion in beliefs about inflation expectations. In Table 5 , the results for the January Consensus Economics surveys are consistent with the view that the adoption of explicit inflation targeting was correlated with less dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation. The coefficient estimates for KL levels have the intuitively plausible signs, and standard statistical diagnostics indicate a good fit.
Econometric exploration of the dispersion of beliefs of private forecasters of inflation
Qualitatively, these results are consistent with the full sample results; the full sample results may be subject to some questions arising from the adequacy of the panel seasonal fixed effects in picking up the variation in the KLn and KLc estimates from monthly surveys over the year. Notes: t-statistics in parentheses based on robust standard errors.
The positive and statistically significant sign on KLc ( β ) reflects the fact that uncertainty about the inflation environment is seen to be fairly persistent from year to year.
The estimate is robust to alternative specifications 2-6 in Table 5 . These findings support the view that a common regional trend toward greater inflation control, as might be reflected in the aggregator dummy, could account for many of the similarities in inflation performance across the region. Such a view would downplay the importance of adopting explicit inflation targeting regimes as a necessary condition for improved inflation outcomes. This can be seen as being consistent with the basic conclusions of Ball and Sheridan (2003) . They find evidence in OECD countries in favor of the hypothesis that greater emphasis on price stability, but not the adoption of inflation targeting per se, is important. 
The inflation targeting dummy coefficient (
This first-difference specification is useful for examining the robustness of our conclusions from the panel regressions in levels. Intuitively, if central banks can more firmly anchor inflation expectations, inflation expectations at longer horizons should be less sensitive to transitory inflation shocks. In other words, the dispersion of inflation expectations for future years should be less variable to short-term inflation variability. In terms of the KL metric, this translates into a prediction that changes in KLn should become less sensitive to variations in KLc as central banks become more transparent and more interested in inflation stability. This prediction is borne out in Table 5 The general narrowing of the forecast distributions could also correspond with biases amongst professional forecasters toward the benefits of formal inflation targeting, and hence the surveys could yield overly conservative dispersions of inflation forecasts. While possible, we also find some evidence in our sample that the reduction in dispersion is accompanied with an increased precision of forecasting accuracy, after correcting of the size of nominal shocks.
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The basic thrust of the results using the IT dummies is obtained using the monetary policy independence dummies described earlier in the paper, but with somewhat less statistical support.
implicit inflation targeting? The panel evidence in this section suggests that the contributions are not so obvious but subtle differences might be linked back to the particular features of explicit inflation targeting regimes.
The commodity price cycle of the 2000s
Rarely do macroeconomists have controlled experiments to assess their models, but one might argue that the commodity price boom-bust in recent years was a good candidate for examining the impact of large "supply" shocks on inflation expectations (Graph 10). In principle, flexible inflation targeting regimes offer the benefits of constrained discretion (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997) . In this view, central banks that constrain themselves to an inflation anchor in a credible fashion should see inflation expectations remain anchored, even as headline inflation deviates from target, ie there needn't be pernicious second round effects arising from runaway wage and price expectations. In Graph 12 it is hard to see any meaningful differences between the two sets of economies that would suggest that explicit inflation targeting has delivered pronounced benefits of constrained discretion. There are nonetheless subtle differences. For example, the Finally, examining the contributions of inflation in food and energy prices to the economies in Asia-Pacific, there is again very little evidence to suggest that the inflation targeters systematically differed in their inflation performance than the non-inflation performers (Graph 13). Table A2 reports the correlations of core inflation with commodity price inflation and with the food and energy components of CPI inflation; the range of correlations for the inflation and non-inflation targeters largely coincide with each other.
Conclusions from the empirical evidence
The empirical evidence confirms that inflation performance in Asia and the Pacific has been admirable. The greater focus on inflation control has translated into a lower and more stable inflation environment.
However, it is difficult to document big differences in inflation performance over the past decade between explicit inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters. This is not to say there were no differences, but that the differences appear to be rather subtle.
Additional research and experience with inflation targeting will help to clarify the reasons for these performance patterns. In the interim, two competing, though not mutually exclusive, views are supportable. One view is that inflation dynamics in the region have been Another view emphasizes the role of central bank mindsets. Over the past decades, central banks in the region and elsewhere saw a broad intellectual, social and economic consensus emerge about the importance of inflation control. Not only was low, stable inflation seen as a key policy goal but it was also felt that central banks had the means to achieve the goal. In addition, supportive changes in central bank governance have taken place as documented in Section II. Hence, Asia-Pacific evidence indicates there are many different ways to achieve price stability. In other words, there is more than one way to skin a cat.
III. Policy implications and conclusions
While the past decade has witnessed greater interest and determination in controlling inflation, central bank thinking about their responsibilities continues to evolve. Exchange-rate misalignments associated with periods of sustained capital inflows have long been of concern because of their impact on inflation and economic growth, and because of fears that the inflows may suddenly stop or reverse leading to stress in local banking systems. 8 The international financial crisis has naturally led even greater focus on the nexus between monetary stability and financial stability, not least owing to some views that the crisis could be attributed in part to lax monetary policy conditions during periods when inflation appeared to be consistent with medium-term trends. This section considers some challenges facing Asia-Pacific central banks as they seek to maintain a primary focus on inflation in a context where concerns about financial system stability, potential volatility of international capital flows and variability of economic growth are taking on greater importance in pursuit of central bank policy objectives.
Some would argue that pursuing multiple independent goals with monetary policy, ie with one policy interest rate, is futile or at least inadvisable. The classic assignment problem in macroeconomics emphasises the need for one independent policy tool for each independent policy goal. Moreover, others might argue that such competing goals would naturally lead to central banks to lose sight of their primary goal of price stability.
There are two basic counterarguments to this view. First, even though the logic of the assignment problem is impeccable, the theoretical assumptions are rather stark when compared to the practical trade-offs facing central banks. Goals related to financial, foreign exchange and capital flow volatility are not truly independent of the goal of price stability.
Achieving price stability is a much more difficult task if stresses associated with these other factors are present in the economy. For example, if a strict focus on inflation control over a certain time horizon is associated with the buildup of imbalances in the economy that leads to inflation (or deflation) pressures further out in the future, then it may be argued that monetary policy faces a trade-off between near-term and longer-term inflation stability. Second, some central banks in the Asia-Pacific region have been able to achieve strong inflation performance while at the same time placing emphasis on exchange rate volatility, capital flows and financial stability concerns (eg India, Indonesia and China At one extreme is a view that central banks need to compartmentalize their policy priorities. A lexicographical approach provides a succinct way to summarise this perspective (Fischer, 2008) . Under this view, central banks would target inflation, and only when inflation was under control would they take countercyclical actions intended to smooth output. Likewise, only when inflation and output stability was achieved would central banks entertain issues associated with exchange rates, capital flows and financial stability. While such priorities may have a theoretical appeal in certain stylized models of the economy, it is less clear it has been operational in a context where the evolution of inflation, output and measures of financial stability depend on each other in a complex fashion. And, such a set of priorities appear to be at odds with the actions taken by central banks during the international financial crisis.
An alternative approach is to smoothly trade-off output and inflation stabilization, while emphasizing key risks associated with auxiliary goals for a range of relevant policy horizons. As noted above, exchange rates, capital flows and financial stability issues have implications for inflation and output at some horizon. The policy conundrum is how best to weigh medium-to long-term concerns against those, say, at the 1-2 year horizon. One could interpret the fact that most central banks in the Asia-Pacific region have adopted price stability targets over the medium term as consistent with this view that strict inflation control at all horizons is not paramount, but rather that there are a range of concerns that need to be addressed. Finally, from technical point of view, such preferences may be best thought of as being state dependent (Svensson (2003) , Disyatat (2005) ).
We would argue that the monetary policy responses in the region and elsewhere to the international financial crisis have been consistent with state-dependent preferences, but from a somewhat different motivation. Consider central banks that may find themselves in somewhat awkward positions at times when government authorities may not have adequately addressed regulatory or external issues, which then result in a crisis environment (Filardo, 2009 Practically, what might these state-dependent priorities mean for central banks, especially those with that have adopted strict inflation targeting in the past. One implication is that inflation targeting regimes need to be flexible. Overly strict, non-state-dependent criteria are not realistic.
Another implication is that conventional inflation targeting regimes and statedependent priorities may be odd bedfellows. While it is possible to argue that flexible inflation targeting regimes can take into account economic and financial undershooting and overshooting, it is not so clear that stretching the reach of such policy regimes contributes in the best way to transparent and hence credible policymaking. Rather, monetary frameworks that explicitly reflect a full range of relevant policy risks would seem appropriate, especially
given the different horizons that apply to short-term inflation and output fluctuations on the one hand and the longer-term boom-bust dynamics on the other. Frameworks such as those adopted by the Bank of Japan (two perspective approach) and the European Central Bank (two pillar approach) would appear more consistent with these types of concerns. In these regimes, there is a clear distinction between the inflation and output dynamics that economists have a reasonable handle on, and those phenomena that defy easy characterisation with conventional forecasting tools. In the case of the latter, the nature of the low probability-high impact risks are qualitative different from standard macro risks about short-term inflation and output.
However, the suggestion that multi-pillar/perspective monetary policy frameworks should arguably dominate strict inflation targeting frameworks does not imply that one size fits all. Quite the contrary, a broader implication from the wide range of policy experiences in Asia-Pacific is that monetary policy strategies may have to be tailored to each central bank depending on the nature of the economic environment. For example, instrument rules would naturally look different in economies depending on a diverse set of factors, not least being:
whether the country is a commodity producers or not; the degree of exposure to food price shocks; the exposure to volatile international capital flows which in turn depends on the sophistication of the domestic financial system to deal with such shocks; openness and the role of the exchange rate in the inflation and growth process. These factors are furthermore likely to change over time which means that monetary policy strategies cannot be static, even if the main objective of policy remains price stability. 
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